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Not Even Wrong - a view of current science of the mind
Abstract: Present progress in mind science is racing away in the direction of denying the 
existence of human freewill and animal and human sentience. This brief paper attempts 
to summarise a few brief reasons why areas of present work by prominent authors have 
departed from fact to the realms of folk psychology and summarises some of the ways in 
which present work can be put right. An experiment is described and carried out in an 
attempt to breach a little more of the present gap between experimental fact and the 
outmoded theory which others have tried to apply blindly.
"We, the Party, control all records, and therefore we control all memories. Then we control the past, do we not ?" Big 
Brother (from George Orwell, "1984"). "Myths which are believed in tend to become true", George Orwell.
“Think for yourselves and ensure others enjoy the privilege to do so, too”, Voltaire.
Introduction
Firstly, three basic aspects of mind and consciousness problems are briefly discussed and 
conclusions given as to measures to be adopted(Note 1).
(1) Overall philosophy of approach
Whilst many general descriptions of what goes on in the mind would appear to assume 
mathematics is the key to understanding the workings of the mind, this seems to be based at 
least in part on the assumption of some form of Platonism or something of the same stripe. In 
summary James Jeans said "the universe appeared to have been designed by a pure 
mathematician", and that it is "more like a great thought than a great machine". 
This sort of thing is simply naive folk psychology. 
There are many reasons why this variety of Platonism is simply folk psychology. I will not try to 
give all of them, as general statements of Jeans's sort have to have the relevance of their 
meaning proved, and this has not been done. Feynman (4) bluntly pointed out "We come across 
these mathematical relationships but they apply to the universe, so the problem of where they 
came from is doubly confusing....Those are philosophical problems I don't know how to answer".
Another simple and related reason is that if the universe has limits - and if it is assumed to be 
infinite this brings a further host of queries which certainly do not propose to support the above 
Jeans type folk psychology(Note 3) - and if the speed of light is finite, then our horizon only 
supports a limited number of particles, often computed as about 1080 . So even if the whole 
universe were to act as some kind of cosmic computer, it is only of a defined size. And because 
the universe is believed to be expanding, the resources inside our horizon are time-dependent 
and limited, ruling out various large numbers calculations as unpredictable. And mathematics 
containing an infinite number of steps could never be carried out. Further, mathematical results 
are time-dependent because of the variation in the number of particles. Indeed if there were a 
'big bang' at the start , there would have been only a small number of particles then with a tiny 
computing power(49).
As Kant pointed out in a similar context "if we look through rose-tinted spectacles it is no wonder 
the world looks rosy". That is to say, to use concepts obtained through mathematics and 
computers as a groundwork for contemporary physical reasoning is simply current folk 
psychology, just as "ghoulies and ghosties and long-legged beasties, and things that go 
BOOMP in the night" helped to give us the Christian Litany of yesteryear. I even used to have a 
prayer book where God was seriously asked to deliver us from those things. Now people try to 
use mathematics in the same way as primitive people used God.
If mathematics works, up to a point, by analogy it only gives us the map and not the country.
Now there are serious wannabe 'new Platonists' like Roger Penrose(18) and their ideas are 
certainly worth examining. In substance they seem to claim that there is some deep underlying 
accord between Plato's world and the true physical world(50).
Their problem is that they never define that accord in useful detail, and they cannot do so. But 
there seems no reason why we cannot consider that mathematics does give us some kind of 
map, and this would also explain psychologically the reason for the firmness of the views of 
those such as Penrose. Certainly, mathematics works, but whether it works 'surprisingly well', or 
simply works up to a point is purely a matter of conjecture and a social scientist or a biologist 
might well hold a different view to that of a physicist. For example in serious considerations of 
life itself, current mathematics has always appeared to be insufficient, as shown historically by 
Rashevsky and Rosen (5) for example.
Our present methods use the McTaggart B series for some of the mathematics, and use the A 
series as well for some parts of the work. B series mathematics alone does not describe the 
human situation completely and adequately and therefore is insufficient.
(2) Physical Problems for a B series only approach 
Callender(6) points out, particularly in section 4 of his paper, that special relativity is inconsistent 
with any philosophically interesting conception of tense. In fact any notion of 'becoming' 
remotely similar to that found  among advocates of the tensed view of time is not compatible 
with Minkowski spacetime. In my opinion that is exactly the sort of thing McTaggart's paradox is 
all about anyway.  Since special relativity is necessary for the appropriate B series descriptions, 
the B series description alone will not suffice. Indeed to introduce the ideas like those of 
'becoming' we would also need a further set of results and the A series falls into that category. 
In earlier works I repeatedly pointed out that an A series model is most unlikely, if not 
impossible, to be completely compatible with appropriate the B series model. Nonetheless both 
models can exist and a B series representation of the A series model can also be created.
It really depends on whether we want to give a complete description of time. Philosophers and 
scientists who do not, are like cartographers who claim that a two dimensional flat map shows 
heights adequately. Those who do want to provide complete descriptions and to describe time 
as completely as they currently can, can use the A series as well as the B series, thus hopefully 
obtaining more information and enlightenment.
If 'becoming' and such ideas are truly not necessary in some parts of a particular program, 
fortunately they do not have to be included but it is unreasonable to leave them out at the start.
Other views on the McTaggart Paradox are of course currently common, and they are 
discussed in probably enough more detail for the present program in Appendices 2 and 3 and in 
the body of this work. Appendix 3 is a brief discussion with Tim Maudlin, who is perhaps the 
foremost expert on the McTaggart Paradox today.
(3) Human and nonhuman requirements
Most people believe that they have free will. The B series as usually devised does not allow free 
will to feature. In fact earlier writings in this series(7) make it plain that actual physical 
measurements(8, 15,16) using normal B series physics show that it certainly seems impossible to 
represent freewill properly in B series physics. It is not assumed here that people do have 
freewill, but the existence of the A series and its use, make free will a possibility in a universe 
world-view. If the possibility does not exist, the universe model does not allow free will to be 
confirmed or denied, making the model a very incomplete one. That is clearly true even if 
individuals choose to deny free will. For to permanently deny free will to every creature in the 
universe - probably including any potential Gods, extraterrestrials or any truly high powered 
intelligence - seems to run against Occam's razor and indeed normal common sense(Note 4).
Further, recent studies(19) suggest that undermining our everyday concept of free will can alter 
our ethical behaviour, a very serious consequence indeed.
Interim Conclusions: As a result of many considerations including (1), (2) and (3) above, in 
further studies and particularly the present study, both the A series and the B series are 
considered. Hopefully the present approach will also be able to eventually heal the gap between 
the theories of Metzinger(11)  and Noe(12), whose ideas in part seem almost diametrically opposed 
to one another but who use much the same experimental data(Note 2).
Introduction to Details of Experiment
From a practical point of view, the article in Wikipedia(63) suggests a number of philosophical, 
religious and other ways of approaching the problem of freewill. I do not consider this essay to 
be tied irretrievably to any of these, nor bound by any of them ! In short I propose not to 
meander in a purposeless philosophical jungle but simply to deal with the facts in a way as 
presented herein.
We use experimental philosophy techniques developed from the work of Marcia Johnson(2) and 
using similar and often identical queries to hers. The general philosophy of approach, though 
importantly not necessarily the specific assumptions, which we try to adopt is that of the very 
early work of Trope and Burnstein(64).
Construal Level Theory (CLT)(1)  suggests that thinking about events that are far into the future 
or the past or considering any events which are remote, either psychologically or in some sense 
physically, and particularly events which seem unlikely or alternatives to reality, triggers a more 
global brain processing style. In analogue, it is like seeing the forest per se, and not the trees. 
Rohrer(13) discusses how both our neural and developmental embodiment shape both our 
mental and linguistic categorizations. The degree of thought abstraction has been found to be 
associated with physical distance which then affects associated ideas and perception of risk.
Work like that of Grenander(14) on pattern theory can possibly be used eventually in a somewhat 
similar approach to ours, but we retain our earlier Berkeley Madonna models such as N003b(7) 
for the moment. Our models seem as if they could do with extending in ways which either use 
the A series directly, or a further extension within an A series model within the B series, the 
former perhaps becoming more and more necessary as further electrophysiological  results 
become available. At all times we need to bear in mind less than optimistic appraisals like those 
of Hacker(32),Vul(33). and nowadays many others. The difficult zone is probably the much over-
hyped 'neuroeconomics' idea and psychological results on such work as the 'prisoner's 
dilemma'(34) and the like, which have to be more carefully evaluated than they have been. 
Looking carefully at popular books(35) like "The Newtonian casino" where the bulk of the hard 
work in experimentation seems to have been to disguise results from casino staff rather than to 
use such important new quantum methods as those of Doyne Farmer and Norman Packard(36), 
and indeed the caustic comments of Dan Ariely (37) on the psychology of the recent banking 
crisis and the situation in banking as known to myself and many others for years, we can easily 
notice that so many modern methods are used in a way which are unfortunately self-serving 
mostly for the benefit of non scientific persons involved rather than precisely scientific in nature. 
This has to mean, at the very least, that a lot of care is necessary as self-serving practices can 
easily and even unintentionally obscure the scientific results and that is of nobody's interest in 
the long term.
For the moment, use of just the A series can only be done somewhat indirectly by using modern 
psychological techniques like Construal level theory and being careful not to insist - especially 
unintentionally by implication - on the direct and necessary ultimate involvement of B series 
physics, probably as distinct from normal statistical methods such as Bayesian statistics.
Predicting the hedonic effect of a future event can be done by simulating it (3) and such facts 
immediately suggest bringing in the methods of CLT.
Olaf Blanke(10) wrote a very interesting paper on mental time travel (MTT), and Gilbert(17) wrote a 
review on a similar theme. It is certainly thought provoking and certain aspects of it mirror my 
own ideas. But Blanke, in his work on 'near death experience' for example, has been noted to 
jump to rather too obvious conclusions of the sort which seem he may well have missed a few 
steps in order to obtain credibility, and must examine his work fairly closely, not taking 
conclusions from correct experimental results necessarily on face value.
Our earlier experiments(20) on the examination(22, 69) of dreams do generally fit in with Construal 
level theory, especially in that the dreams contained unexpected elements of the future in an 
abstract form more often than in a very concrete form, although both occurred.
Clearly if we plan to invoke the A-series, it is easy to see how the elements of the future 
construed or envisaged in the mind of the present, have a good deal in common with the 
elements of the past. Rhyming philosopher/psychologist Alexander Pope many years ago stated 
"Remembrance and reflection - how allied ! What thin partitions sense from thought divide". Our 
understanding of memory today tries to stress "thick partitions" that divide sensory experience 
and thoughts or memories. This view considers that processing of sensory information and later 
cognitive activity can change thoughts and experienced memories. If one is prepared to accept 
at least the possibility of subscribing, at least up to a point, to this well researched and 
frequently accepted view, then if we look at contemplations of future events, the partitions 
between thoughts of past events and thoughts of future events seem as if they could be a lot 
thinner than many people nowadays try to suggest. A common approach in considering 
thoughts of the future is to revert to B-series physics and look for simple causal relationships 
between events as they occur. But this is simply an interpretation of what is being noticed. We 
are concerning ourselves with facts. The basic standpoint might be rather to take as first starting 
point a WYSIWYG viewpoint, in that we are measuring mental phenomena and there appears 
on the face of it, little basic difference in the state of mind of the individual between memory and 
forecast, though there is a tendency to pull down the shutters of the mind,as it were, and 
assume that "we cannot see the future" and so forth. I do not claim anything as simple as that, 
rather that we should thrust aside the shibboleth that only the B-series of Newton, Leibniz and 
for that matter Einstein is going to provide simplistic explanations of the universe. To 
immediately use fMRI results to justify the results of such as Leibniz, Newton and Einstein is 
really a circular argument. Most certainly, we should, as Addis(66) and many others have done, 
learn all we can about the brain, but it is important to take into account the conclusions of such 
people as Hacker(32) and Vul(33) . In fact we must go further and know that careful interpretation 
of fMRI results and so on may fall outside the realm of Newtonian physics. It seems probable 
that even in a fairly accurate A-series representation, the so-called 'future' and the 'past' have 
somewhat different configurations, but they certainly seem like each other. Differences have to 
be considered, but the most obvious problem is with ourselves, that most people always feel 
somewhat assured that we remember the past, and are less clear on the future. This of course 
tends to be borne out when we check but is possibly not part of the initial mental process. It is 
possible to think of mystical contemplation and other alleged things of this sort which often 
regard the human position in the universe as in some way timeless, but this idea tends to be a 
red herring in our present lucubrations, except insofar that these alleged phenomena at least 
provide a clue to the fact that modern (essentially Western) ways of thinking are a limited and 
very restricted way of looking at the world. The idea of assuming that any other approach simply 
requires oddball stimuli(70) (which are themselves an important consideration of course) or some 
such special situation, restricts current thinking of real phenomena too much.
The present experiment, therefore, looks to see if the results we obtain for an experiment 
somewhat like Johnson's are like those of Johnson(2) in waking time with similar or the same 
subjects as we previously used, and we bear in mind the fact that with modern CLT(21), 
increased temporal distance should increase the overall attractiveness of a high-level construal 
value relative to a low-level construal value. To quote(21) "A common assumption in the 
behavioural sciences is that the value of an outcome diminishes as temporal distance from the 
outcome increases - positive outcomes seem less positive when removed in time (intertemporal 
discounting). The prediction from CLT, however, is that increased temporal distance, as with 
any psychological distance, should shift the overall attractiveness of an outcome closer to its 
high level construal value and away from its low-level construal value. When the low-level value 
of an outcome is more positive than its high-level value, temporal discounting would obtain, so 
that the outcome would be less attractive in the more distant future. When the high-level value 
of an outcome is more positive, however, the outcome should be more attractive in the distant 
future .... thinking of trees may prompt us to think of tomorrow, whereas thinking of the forest 
may prompt us to think of next year. The link between distance and construal has important 
implications for perception, categorization, and inference".
Experimental Procedure and Results
The aim was not to produce important new confirmatory material in a sort of analogy to the 
Millikan oil drop experiment, which itself raised a great deal of controversy(72), but instead to see 
if and how any experiment in the A series could be designed. Hopefully, it may be even possible 
to allow such an experiment to begin to act as a prototype. Any useful result would simply be 
regarded as a plus point and a minor assistance as a minor proof of concept and to be a step on 
a way to provide an A series format. In the event, that is approximately what happened. Some 
confirmatory material is of course already available(20).
Details are given in Appendices 1a and 1b.
20 subjects, from the same group as was used for earlier experimentation(20), were used for 30 
interviews using a total of  approximately 24,000 queries.
The results agree with those of Trope(1) and many others, in that the degree of abstraction 
seems to increase with the time differential between the moment of the test and when the event 
is to conceived to take place. 
We used the 1 to 7 scaling procedure of Johnson(2) and scoring was found accurate to about  + 
1 at the 80% confidence level and + 2 at the 98% confidence level. The percentage of results 
which could be construed as 'abstract', by occurring in the first quartile of an abstract-concrete 
scale were as follows. Distant Past  40% abstract, Past 17% abstract, Present/fantasy 33% 
abstract, Future 1% abstract, Distant Future 25% abstract.  Also the correlation coefficient of 
degree of abstraction at the time of testing with both level of perceived detail and the level of 
personal involvement was high in the near past and distant future but lower in the distant past 
and near future .
Conclusions
Clearly this is only a beginning. It seems to me that a major difference in the present 
experiments is where we included future events as retaining a right to some kind of reality, as 
well as past events, present events and merely imagined events in our very simple survey, and 
we even attempted to begin to clearly distinguish presently imagined events from real past and 
future events. Reality monitoring(2) is of course essential as a guide to the relevance of  such 
results.
We need many more experiments in experimental philosophy and it may need a survey device 
somewhat similar to the Amazon Mechanical Turk(65) and other such ideas to get a lot of results. 
Though such experiments might be inexpensive and realistic, they must at all times be hands-
on, carefully planned and not mindlessly computerised.
A further consideration or lemma is implied that not just the neural basis of memory and future 
must be considered in the way of Addis(66) , nor as the investigations of Trope(1) imply, but neural 
computation using neural computers of essentially an analog kind may be needed. I used 
analog computers in my very earliest experiments(67) and their use is in essence different to that 
of digital computers. After the many years of work by Minsky and many others on AI , it has 
become certain that simplistic digital computers are unlikely to do the whole job or even 
impossible to use effectively in the area. At least B-Z computers and similar devices may 
enhance progress(68).
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Note 1
The title of the present paper ("Not Even Wrong") is of course the same title as that of a recent 
book by Woit38 and apparently derives from a catch phrase by Pauli, to the approximate effect 
that certain theoretical results did not lead to conclusions with respect to substantial and known 
physical fact. Woit's book is of course about modern string theory and I would add that it is a 
historical fact that, whilst I was Editor-in-Chief of the "International Journal of Theoretical 
Physics" for very many years, comments of a somewhat similar nature were often being made 
to me about string theory (old version). I suppose it is a matter of "O tempora, O mores !" but 
the world may not have changed much since Cicero's day. Woit's current views on string theory 
seems to be summarised in an amusing popular video on Bloggingheads39 by Woit and 
Callender. Readers may be relieved to find that a detailed knowledge of string theory is not 
required to read the present peroration, but somewhat less than relieved at finding that the 
author's view is that, from the viewpoint of enlightened neuroscience, the whole of modern 
physics suffers the fate that string theory does from Woit's perspective.  To start with, modern 
physics appears have no clear way to even describe let alone deny, prove or delimit human or 
animal free will and I spend much of the paper dealing with that matter in various ways. The so-
called "grandfather paradox", a moderately obvious possible paradox since the days of Godel 
right up to the modern work of Visser and Thorne, is also confounded, denied and 
misunderstood in modern physics, even to the point where we are asked to even believe that 
the denial of even the possibility of human freewill is essential to an understanding of modern 
physics. I've tried to deal with matters like the "grandfather paradox" briefly in Appendix 2, which 
in particular discusses the ideas of Maudlin, whose views are actually much more reasonable 
than those of many other people, though still pretty farfetched.
Note 2 
In fact Metzinger in http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/commentaries/NCC-Metzinger.rtf does 
come surprisingly close to reaching a meaningful compromise, but at the end of the day the 
required result is completely outside of his frame of reference and he reverts to what amounts to 
a naive B series or 'flat time' approach. 
Note 3
We have a similar sort of objection at the very least. For example, Rucker(52) says "If the 
Mindscape (mental space of mathematical objects) is a One, then it is a member of itself, and 
thus can only be known through a flash of mystical vision. No rational thought is a member of 
itself, and so no rational thought can turn the Mindscape into itself". Davies(51) , Tegmark(53)
and many others concur to somewhat similar points.
Furthermore, we must bear in mind, as already stated here, that this rather Platonist view of 
such people as Jeans and Penrose is really a supposition, pure folk psychology and they have 
no proof of it. It also is becoming a very shaky view and we really do not know of any good proof 
or justification for the rather complicated arguments needed to bolster it up by now. It could 
almost be said to be a modern version of epicycle theory. 
Note 4
Voltaire's satire is perhaps too bold for today's more thin skinned scientists so I have to refrain 
from further comment. I have certainly no inclination to emulate the likes of Richard Dawkins or 
Colin McGinn in satire or disagreement particularly as misunderstanding has made the present 
topic even more controversial than their own views.Indeed, just as Voltaire(9) lampooned the 
possible initiator of all our problems - Leibniz - as Mr. Pangloss, so too we today could lampoon 
the large Roger Penrose style crowd of du Sautoys, and all the rest of them. The name 
Pangloss translates to English as "all tongue" and "windbag" and one can easily be as 
exasperated today by such persons - even more exasperated than Richard Dawkins is by 
Christians and other religious people, since the views of Christians and the like are so different 
from those of scientists that the difference is usually easy to tell, whereas with neoPanglossians 
there is the unfortunate fact that they are still leading science astray, as it could be said Leibniz 
and Newton did, though at least those pair were somewhere near the right course. In effect this 
motley neoPanglossian rabble comprises most of the mathematically inclined mind theorists 
today, a few of those who even, like Roger Penrose, seem to be prepared to believe for the 
sake of their beloved 'B series only mathematics' that conditions in the brain bear resemblance 
to conditions not too far from absolute zero, and who are quite prepared to cast away freewill so 
as not to lose even a fraction of the charisma of their precious 'B-series only mathematics'. Like 
Voltaire we can say "if the applied mindless robot style mathematics of today gives us the best 
of all possible worlds, then what must the rest of them be like?" The 'many worlds' scientists of 
today have not been able to avoid this problem either, though I suppose it could be argued that 
more abstract ideas like complex system theory may have striven to do so, but probably 
ultimately failed to do so completely. We are truly analog people and have created a digital 
world of our own. Just as the painter Lowry knew a matchstick world of poverty and starvation, 
we know a digital world of effective computer science. Lowry at least had the sense to realise 
that there was also a real world out there and not just his matchstick world of art. In the manner 
of Thomas Huxley's alleged phraseology where 'Archbishop' is modernised to 'Mathematician', 
we can say "I would rather be descended from an ape than from a computer". Voltaire says that 
if people truly wish to think, they should not cling to old and obviously incorrect ideas, but should 
form their opinions based on experiential knowledge. Voltaire's view should probably also be 
one of the cornerstones of experimental philosophy.
In very lay terms, modern scientists simply insist that the collection of some scientific data is 
more real than people's thoughts. It is possibly wrong to insist on this, and a bad early 
assumption. DT-MRI results, for example, in the way they are produced and calculated, will 
seem to have some sort of eventual one to one correlation with an updated Leibnizian or 
Newtonian type of reality. Even Bohm and Einstein, in a way, strove to continually cede first 
place to Newton or Leibniz and certainly the same is true even with modern string theorists and 
cosmologists. That fact, whatever the eventual achievements or otherwise of modern string 
theory and indeed cosmology, has become very true. 
Even modern philosophers seem to tend to readily kowtow to this rather notorious idea by 
effectively putting the heavy horse of philosophy behind the agile and profitable cart of science, 
whether or not they choose to admit it.
All this is in no way to say that we must put aside the theories of Bohr or Einstein, for example, 
but we must remember to trim any recognition of their relevance. In a way, for example, the 
"shut-up-and-calculate" pragma(71) tries to trim that relevance, but clearly leads to puzzlement 
and to a physics that only relatively primitive entities like a dog can understand(45). Of course it is 
important to realise that we are not aiming here to solve philosophical problems created by 
Bohr's physics - though in a sense we may do so - rather embracing modern physics in its 
entirety and then, like Oliver Twist, 'asking for more'.
Appendix 1a
Experimental Procedure
1. Subjects were asked  to  remember events like a social occasion, a  trip to the library, or a 
visit  to the dentist. Perceived  events were  selected because they were  likely to differ in many 
ways,  for example, degree of  social  interaction and type and intensity of emotional tone. 
2. Subjects were  asked  to visualise events like a real future social occasion, a real trip to the 
library, or a real visit  to the dentist. Perceived  events were  selected because they were  likely 
to differ in many ways,  for example, degree of  social  interaction and type and intensity of 
emotional tone.
3. Subjects were also asked to imagine (at the time of the experiment) the occurrence of events 
like a dream, a fantasy, or an unfulfilled intention. These imagined events differed in degree of 
conscious construction and degree of potential realization.  Thus we attempted to include a 
relatively broad representation of events of each type.
Examples of Social occasion: "Think of a recent (or for 2, future) social occasion-party,  dinner, 
or  a gathering of  some sort  that  involved more  than  two people  including yourself." 
Visit  to  a library:  "Think of a recent (or for 2, future)  time you spent in a library." 
Trip to dentist: "Think of a recent (or for 2, future) time you visit the dentist." 
Now in cases 1 and 2, these are genuine cases which either did happen or will 
possibly/probably happen, like going to school last week or next week. In fact we include cases 
like. "Think of when you went to school last week and again last year" and "Think of when you 
go to school next  week and again next year".
For case 3:
Dream:  "Think  of  a recent dream-any  dream you  think  you can remember fairly well." 
Fantasy:  "Think  of  a recent  fantasy-that is,  something  you made up and imagined while you 
were awake-any current fantasy you can remember fairly well." 
Unfulfilled  intention: "Think of a recent time you intended to do or thought about doing 
something, but then you never got around to doing it. It should be something you actually might 
have done but did not."
Appendix 1b
Experimental Procedure, further details of questioning
Scoring chart
1. This event  is 1 = dim; 7 = sharp/clear
2. This event is 1 = black and white; 7 = entirely color
3. This event involves visual detail 1 = little or none; 7 = a lot
4. This event involves sound 1 = little or none; 7 = a lot
5. This event involves smell 1 = little or none; 7 = a lot
6. This event involves touch 1 = little or none; 7 = a lot
7. This event involves taste 1 = little or none; 7 = a lot
8. Overall vividness is 1 = vague; 7 = very vzvid
9. The event is 1 = sketchy; 7 = very detailed
10. Order of events is 1 = confusing; 7 = comprehensible
I I. Story line is 1 = simple; 7 = complex
12. Story line is 1 = bizarre; 7 = realistic
13. The location where the event takes place is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/dzstinct
14. General setting is 1 = unfamiliar; 7 =familiar
15. Relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory for the event is I = vague; 7 = clear/distinct
16. Relative spatial arrangement of people in event is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct
17. Where the event takes place is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/distznct
18. the year is I = vague; 7 = clear/distinct
19. the season is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/dzstinct
20. the day is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct
21. the hour is 1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct
22. The event seems 1 = short; 7 = long
23. The overall tone of the memory is 1 = negative; 7 =positive
24. In this event I was 1 = a spectator; 7 = a participant
25. At the time the event seemed like it would have serious implications: 1 = not at all; 7 = definitely
26. The event does have serious implications: 1 = not at all; 7 = definitely
27. Any feelings at the time: 1 = not at all; 7 = definitely
28. Feelings at the time were 1 = negative; 7 = positive
29. Feelings at the time were 1 = not intense; 7 = very intense
30. As I am remembering now, my feelings are 1 = not intense; 7 = very intense
3 1. I remember what I thought at the time: 1 = not at all; 7 = clearly
32. This memory reveals or says about me: 1 = not much; 7 = a lot
33. Overall, I remember this event: 1 = hardly; 7 = very well
34. I remember events relating to this memory that took place: in advance of the event: 1 = not at all; 7 = yes, clearly
35. after the event: 1 = not at all; 7 = yes, clearly
36. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? I = a great deal of doubt; 7 = no doubt 
whatsoever
37. Since it happened, I have thought about this event: 1 = not at all; 7 = many times
38. Since it happened, I have talked about it: 1 = not at all; 7 = marry times
39. About when did this event happen? Circle one: just today yesterday few days ago last week few weeks ago last
Appendix 2
The "Grandfather Paradox" and similar matters
Now a common word used in physics in such circumstances as the "grandfather paradox" is to 
say that cases like that are 'unphysical'. Popular encylopedias41 tend to define 'unphysical' in 
cases like singularities in general relativity as simply meaning (in the GR case) that general 
relativity ultimately ceases to be an accurate description of gravity somewhere in the vincinity of 
what would otherwise be a singularity. Alternatively, encylopedias42 tend to define "a non-
physical entity" as "an entity that lacks a physical or material body or material or physical 
characteristics. Non-physical entities may be considered hypothetical, e.g. deities of religions no 
longer conventionally believed in, and used as an example of an imaginary being in analytical 
philosophy, or they may refer to concepts whose existence is considered in philosophical 
argument, such as qualia. Or in esotericism they may refer to devas, gods, spirits, and so on, 
which either lack a body, or possess a subtle body only, and are generally considered belonging 
to a supra-physical plane of existence. Or in philosophy of mathematics, many people consider 
numbers, spaces, sets, and so forth to be existent and yet not physical". 
Surely all this is simply begging the question or petitio principii, "assuming the initial point", if we 
intend to try to regard modern physics as a fair description of modern observable 
phenomena.....
According to Herrick43 '''seldom is anyone going to simply place the conclusion word-for-word 
into the premises .... Rather, an arguer might use phraseology that conceals the fact that the 
conclusion is masquerading as a premise. The conclusion is rephrased to look different and is 
then placed in the premises".
Maudlin40 states specifically in his current (2010) update of the Stanford Encylopedia entry on 
the possibility of time travel that "conceptual and logical “possibility” do not entail possibility in a 
full-blooded sense. What exactly such a full-blooded sense would be in case of time travel, and 
whether one could have reason to believe it to obtain, remain to us obscure". So he is not 
explicit about what, if any restrictions would have to be placed on, for example, general relativity 
notions, if he cannot find a way round, in real and practical terms, the problems arising from 
paradoxes like the "grandfather paradox". 
But we know that formulations like those of Godel, Thorne or Visser could apparently lead to an 
unsolved "grandfather paradox" and if we are to believe modern physics, we are left with the 
fact that, from Maudlin's recent comments at least, they are in no way resolved in it. So modern 
physics is in fact, as currently formulated, apparently inconsistent and/or incomplete in quite 
serious ways. 
Maudlin's book,"The Metaphysics Within Physics", which basically consists of a ten year 
collection of some of his essays, has already been reviewed, often very kindly, by many other 
researchers. But to me, though it is somewhat confusing it must nonetheless be considered, 
even if there is the feeling that throughout this work that Maudlin may be acting on a very 
different set of basic premises to myself. I basically have the feeling, which I do not necessarily 
hold as a philosophy, that the gaps in present day physics are of what one might call a 'Kuhnian' 
nature, and modern physics and its background of philosophy, psychology and metaphysical 
what-have-you has gaps which even Thomas Kuhn at his strongest might not have envisaged. 
For example, even when Maudlin criticises Earman, he does so within a framework of implicit 
acceptance of a large blob of B series physics, as he seems to make strong arguments invoking 
general relativity, or at least of some pattern containing general relativity. I will have none of this. 
The B series is the B series, and acceptable as such up to a point, with its faults, but from the 
present standpoint we must also consider some version of the A series or at least some partial 
or restricted mapping or some such thing of the A series. 
Later in this discussion I will go into some detail on Maudlin's book where it seems immediately 
relevant to the matters to hand, but I must pre-empt the comment that my interpretation of the A 
series is too vague, or that my "Many Bubble Interpretation" is too vague, by pointing out bluntly 
that B series quantum physics, for example, has had some 80 years to put its house in order 
since my late colleague Prince Louis de Broglie won his Nobel laureate, and quantum physics 
has still not succeeded in becoming clear, to the point where the current well-written popular 
tome(45) "How to teach Physics to your Dog" can actually make quantum physics clearer to a dog 
than it is to a human being. That does not suggest that dogs have superior insight into modern 
physics than humans, of course, but it probably shows a lot of things about people that there is 
probably not time to discuss here, and that fact could be left to further papers on X-phi. To 
summarise my own views on quantum physics, the fact is that many people still accept the 
Copenhagen Interpretation, which is an interpretation often known to quantum physics students 
as the "shut-up-and-calculate" interpretation, and nobody even raises their eyebrows about its 
popular title any more. Maybe dogs are beginning to acquire more free will than humans have, 
and humans are dragooning one another into losing their free will. Sartre and the other 
existentialists of his period may well have thought that to be the present state of affairs.
So quantum physics has had some 80 years to mature to an understandable subject and it has 
simply got less and less clear. Literally millions of dedicated scientists have had time to clarify it, 
but problems have got worse and worse to the point of apparently insoluble paradoxes. My 
position, that we need the A series as well as the B series, has had little work at any time, 
except by me personally. And I am getting results. I do appreciate the problems of those such 
as Maudlin with McTaggart's paradox, which is hard to understand and both confused and 
confusing, and I particularly appreciate Maudlin's points about using the C series rather than the 
A series, but as a traditionalist I am using the A series as a starter and going on from there. So 
far I have had success with dreamwork and am in this paper itself carrying out experiments on 
construal level theory. Further work may relate also to chemical analogue computers, but I see 
no further quick success so far in that field and a lot more hard work. 
To return to Maudlin's book,"The Metaphysics Within Physics". The sections of greatest interest 
are in Chapter 4, on "The Passing of Time". On p109 he says quite blatantly "I believe in a block 
universe". But this is not enough, nor is a simple 'moving present' if we want to even properly 
describe the concept of free will - even if some people then propose to disprove or condemn it. 
Maudlin also, on p109, admits that his views are 'unusual' and and he also says he does not 
deny the objective flow of time, presumably within some 4d universe. 
Now that admission is important, as if time flows, a proper physics should be able to describe 
that flow. But he seems to totally miss the point that time does not seem to be easily described 
as one entity, but consists of two different ones, described as A series and B series say.  The 
fact that McTaggart is somewhat muddled, as Maudlin admits, should not obscure for us the fact 
that time has to be carefully described, not ,as it were, as it was described  in the heavy 
excitement of Gottingen after World War 1, but in the light of centuries of repeated failure by 
science to quantify freewill and time and the present muddled state of physics in its dealings in 
particular with quantum mechanics.Perhaps scientists have 'shut-up-and-calculated' for too 
long, because of impressive results in the short term in large but nonetheless limited areas of 
physics.
.
Maudlin's arguments about the passing of time at around p112  seem rather vague, along the 
lines of a philosopher having to cope with nonexistent physics. I would thus take the view that 
the problem is not with Maudlin, but with physics, and that I am correct in trying to put it right by 
using the A series in addition to the B series. Perhaps as somewhat of a sop to Maudlin, I would 
concur that this may not be the only way to solve this problem !  But here I bow to McTaggart, 
and suggest his thinking, perhaps somewhat crude by today's standards, can be taken as being 
along the right lines - by following his leads, the existence of freewill is maintained and the work 
is in producing more physics, which I am showing can be done and is indeed successful in 
producing results to date7,20,22, and in the present paper.
On pp 158-8 Maudlin goes on to say "all God did was to fix the physical laws and the initial 
physical state of the universe, and the rest of the state of the universe has evolved
(either deterministically or stochastically) from that". Now we are thus clearly left with a denial of 
free will in Maudlin's theories. That is somewhat of a shame, as he seems to be renouncing 
fact for mathematical fiction, even if in practice he seems to try to post enough philosophical 
provisos so that he can change his mind later if he has to.
The Deutsch 'multiple universe' theory in fact seems at the moment the most likely of many 
other 'multiverse' approaches, most of which make use of multiple artificially mathematically 
created univerese without any real known substance of any sort, but clearly the 'block universe' 
type model leaves such systems or worldviews clearly in the realm of B series physics and so 
my usual objections still apply in general.
Two wikis(46) and a book(47) sum up the Deutsch "multiverse hypothesis" and even by implication 
and reference other approaches such as that of Rees or Tegmark,  so I will not recapitulate the 
Deutsch approach. It's pretty hypothetical and the term 'Occam's razor' is frequently used in 
connection with it for obvious reasons. However the "grandfather paradox" does not seem to 
apply to the Deutsch multiverse, and this fact relates to the enormous number of postulated 
worlds. The existence in actual fact of these postulated worlds is a matter of some debate within 
the theory. And then there are, if you want there to be, the looming dilemmas of 
all the philosophy attached to such a matter. Maudlin's work cited above(44) is one way such 
matters can be handled. There's a discussion group(48) about the Deutsch multiverse called 
"Fabric of Reality" which I read and often contributed to for many years.   
Vlatko Vendral(54) and others try to consider an interesting test for the existence of multiverses of 
one kind and another. Such results have been considered seriously by those such as Dieter 
Zeh(55). Vendral's essay(56) on Maxwell's demons is certainly interesting if viewed in the light of 
modern quantum computing. Jurgen Schmidhuber(57), Caslav Brukner(58), Bruno Marchal(59), 
Jacques Vallee(60) and many others have also tried to follow similarly difficult paths and of 
course much positive comment could be made about their work. Vendral(54), however, suggests 
that perhaps some of such authors are leaving the mainstream of science for speculation, which 
is harmless but normally insufficiently rewarding. Arthur C. Clarke, H.G. Wells and other similar 
writers may well have inspired further research and even have been interesting to scholars, but 
statements like that of Vallee(61) seem unlikely to become of important use for further immediate 
research, but are closer to futurology, film scripting or simply science fantasy. To be 
overambitious can be unhelpful to immediate progress and to seek hostages against posterity in 
this way can easily overshadow real merit. All this seemingly sends working scientists up a 
metaphorical Tower of Babel, rather than allowing them, like stout Cortez allegedly did, to "stare 
with wild surmise" at something new to them, like the Pacific Ocean would have been to Cortez. 
Or, indeed, to do as Cantor did, and some would say is being done even now in the n-category 
cafe(62). However, none of our current investigators in the area, other than myself, seem to even 
try to use the A series. One reason that their results are so far simply rather hypothetical may 
well be that they have not dealt with the A series nor even considered people's human 
characteristics adequately. Instead they tend to grope for ideas like 'human freewill' and 'god' 
within the rather stultified arena of existing mathematical formalism - or try to create new, and 
even more stultifying formalism. Cantor and to a lesser extent Godel and Chaitin have shown 
that the power of mathematics can bring us to a fresh arena of thought, rather than to a 
metaphorical Tower of Babel as Woit might well claim has now happened with string theory, for 
example. Towers of Babel may indeed be fascinating, especially to mathematicians, but are off 
topic here. Such speculation is not to be condemned, of course, but it can be rather a pity. 
Appendix 3
Professor Maudlin's comments
There is clearly much too much to comment on, but let me make two brief points:
1: McTaggart's confusion is easy to state: he write as though there is exactly one "A-series", 
which changes through time. This is incorrect. The A-series consists in the events in the history 
of the universe categorized as (in the simplest case) "past", "present" and "future". So even 
from the perspective the physics McTaggart knew (Relativity is not very important here), there 
are an infinitude of different A-series: on for each moment of time categorized as "present". In 
sum, given the B-seriese and a single event (or single moment) to count as "present" you can 
define an A-series, and since there is an infinitude of such events, there is an infinitude of A-
series. But each A-series postulates nothing more in reality than one already has in the B-
series. As I mentioned, the B-series has an intrinsic direction- the basic asymmteric relation of 
"earlier than". So "starting with the A-series", you have no more to work with than someone who 
starts with the B-series and has tken-reflective terms like "now".
2. As a compatibilist, I do not think any issues about time or determinism have any bearing on 
the issue of free will. Indeed, I do  not think there is any such issue. Nothing in physics prevents 
the description of humans as deliberating about different courses of action, evaluating the 
foreseen outcomes, or possible outcomes, and acting on that evaluation. As Hume points out, 
this just is free will, which we have if we are not a prisoner in chains, and are capable of this sort 
of deliberation.
Reply to Professor Maudlin
1. In effect Professor Maudlin seems to be saying that he thinks that anything useful in the A 
series can also be conveyed in the B series. I have no argument with that in principle, though it 
is conjectural until specific cases are established.  But equally, we might have well been using 
pre-Kepler epicycles nowadays to describe planetary motion and might well ultimately have very 
similar physics to what we have now ! 
In mental terms, though, the crux of it is that the A series and the B series 'look' different and the 
physical techniques of modern mathematics seem to describe fairly well the physical 
movements of physically apparent entities like planets etc. but are shrouded in mystery when it 
comes to dealing with the human mind. 
In my opinion the experimental philosopher must adopt the stand of considering things as they 
are and not simply on the abstract plane of thought - metaphorically his armchair must burn, to 
adopt a current phraseology - and he must deal directly with the mind.
Obviously I have done my best to provide a B series mapping of A series concepts, using my 
Berkeley Madonna models and other models, but there is a long history of cases of persons 
who are, or claim to be, A-series supporters, B-series supporters, and A and B series 
supporters. It is clear that believed differences in A and B series have taxed the minds of these, 
often prominent people. The book of Gale73 provides many examples of this fact, and Professor 
Maudlin might well refer rightly to some of these as being due to 'confusion'. The matter is 
somewhat simplified in the approach in Callender's elementary introduction75 to time where in 
common with many, Callender tries to speak of 'tensed' and 'tenseless' theories of time as if 
these have real differences and each have possibly valuable properties of their own. Then, 
maybe, we are given the thought fom Callender75 that one view or the other is superfluous or of 
less basic merit.  Like Professor Maudlin I want to resolve the problems, but am not, at this 
stage, prepared to cut the Gordian knot but rather prefer to examine the real implications of the 
ideas associated with the A series as far as mental awareness and understanding are required. 
I really have to mention Putnam's comments on 'tensed' time which arise through special 
relativity and perhaps in other ways, as they inspire interest and suggest further examination 
rather than simple dismissal of the A series. In fact, rather than suggesting the abandonment of 
the A series, they suggest that important differences may exist between A series and B series 
and may even enforce the idea that the B series describes a simplistically devised "physical" 
world and the A series is more in concordance with a "mental" world of consciousness but a 
detailed program would need much thought and a simple approximation might only too easily 
lapse into naivety.
I believe that the difference or otherwise between A and B series may be one of today's cardinal 
problems in experimental philosophy, and for once some sort of solution, at least of a currently 
expedient nature, may be obtainable and even inherent in my present studies. I hope that this is 
not too weak a statement as I expect actual physical results and appear to be obtaining these 
gradually. 
2. On compatibilism, Professor Maudlin's view seems to be probably a healthy one and 
ultimately perhaps correct. Indeed, there probably may not be a problem with time, provided we 
can consider it in the right way. But this may need the A series as well as the B series, at least 
to be going on with.
